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REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL JUVENILE 
INCARCERATION MODELS AS A 
BLUEPRINT FOR REHABILITATIVE 
REFORM OF JUVENILE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Robert Laird* 
Adolescence marks a unique and transformative time in a person’s 
physical, emotional, and intellectual development and requires special 
considerations in the realm of criminal justice. This Comment explores how 
rehabilitative models of criminal justice are better suited than punitive 
models to recognize and accommodate the intricacies and special factors 
inherent in juvenile delinquency and uses examples from regional 
international bodies to illustrate how the United States can adopt measures 
that align with modern-day neurology and psychiatry. First, this Comment 
explores the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders as adolescent, semi-
autonomous individuals who are more likely to be incompetent to stand trial 
than adult offenders. Second, this Comment demonstrates how rehabilitative 
theories of punishment, rather than retributive theories, better align with the 
unique characteristics of adolescence. Third, this Comment shows how the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights have embraced rehabilitative juvenile justice programs and how 
member states have integrated those ideals to varying degrees and in 
imaginative ways. This Comment also explores how the United States 
remains uniquely committed to a more punitive retributive regime that rose 
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to prominence in the 1980s and fails to deter juvenile delinquency or reduce 
recidivism. Finally, this Comment proposes five moderate steps that states 
can adopt, without abandoning goals to reduce recidivism or deter crime, to 
reflect evolving international norms and to better embody the traditional 
rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1989, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC) and it has been adopted with “global support” by almost 
every country in the world.1 Article 37(b) of the CRC establishes broad 
guidelines for the incarceration and detention of juvenile offenders and 
provides that the “arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child . . . shall be 
used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period 
of time.”2 This has led to the reformation of juvenile justice systems 
throughout the world, including in Europe and Latin America,3 as countries 
have modeled their systems to comply with the CRC. It has also led the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR), and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR) to develop jurisprudence that reflects the rehabilitative goals of 
juvenile justice and the semi-autonomous nature of adolescents.4 However, 
although it played a major role in drafting the CRC, the United States has yet 
to sign the Convention and has not taken steps to ensure that its juvenile 
justice system complies with the values enumerated in the CRC.5 Without 
pressure to adhere to the standards set forth in the CRC, states within the 
United States have continued to administer primarily retributive juvenile 
criminal justice systems that do not embody established international norms. 
This Comment argues that the United States has failed to realize the 
rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice and to take into account the fluid nature 
and degree of adolescents’ autonomy and culpability. Accordingly, the 
 
 1 Cynthia Price Cohen, The Role of the United States in the Drafting of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 185, 185 (2006). After South Sudan and 
Somalia ratified the CRC in 2015, the United States remains the only country in the United 
Nations not to ratify the Convention. Sarah Mehta, There’s Only One Country That Hasn’t 
Ratified the Convention on Children’s Rights: US, ACLU (Nov. 20, 2015, 1:30 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights/treaty-ratification/theres-only-one-country-hasnt-
ratified-convention-childrens [https://perma.cc/Z7N6-RZD7]; see also G.A. Res. 44/25, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989). 
 2 G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 1, at ¶ 37(b). 
 3 Mary Beloff, Los Adolescentes y el Sistema Penal. Elementos Para Una Discusión 
Necesaria en la Argentina Actual, 6 REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PALERMO 97 
(2005) (discussing the history and evolution of juvenile justice systems in Latin America 
broadly and in Argentina specifically). 
 4 See generally COMM’N MINISTERS COUNCIL OF EUR., GUIDELINES OF THE COMMITTEE OF 
MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ON CHILD-FRIENDLY JUSTICE (2010) [hereinafter 
GUIDELINES] (providing concrete recommendations for member states of the Council of 
Europe to reform their juvenile justice systems); INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 9 (observing that Article 19 of the American 
Convention guarantees juveniles the opportunity for rehabilitation). 
 5 Cohen, supra note 1, at 185–86. 
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United States should adopt aspects of juvenile justice systems developed in 
other countries that better embody the rehabilitative ideal. Part I of this 
Comment provides background on juvenile offenders in the criminal justice 
system. Specifically, Part I.A reviews the unique characteristics of juvenile 
offenders and explains how adolescents lack full competency to be judged 
by a criminal proceeding. Subsequently, in Part I.B, this Comment illustrates 
how a punitive juvenile justice system that is justified by retributive or 
deterrence theories of punishment is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
broad consensus in our scientific community that juvenile offenders have 
diminished agency and competency. Instead, juvenile criminal justice 
systems should be focused on rehabilitative systems that reflect adolescents’ 
psychical, emotional, and neurological development. In Part II.A, this 
Comment broadly reviews juvenile justice systems found in Europe, Latin 
America, and the United States and argues that the United States’ juvenile 
justice systems fail to embody the rehabilitative ideal of juvenile justice. 
However, regional international courts and their member states provide 
myriad examples of how to create more rehabilitative juvenile justice 
systems, and Part II.B of this Comment outlines aspects of several different 
systems that would fundamentally improve the United States’ juvenile 
criminal systems without sacrificing legitimate public safety interests. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Childhood and adolescence are marked by diminished competency and 
limited agency. These features make juvenile justice systems poorly suited 
for traditional theories of punishment like retribution or deterrence. Instead, 
they reinforce the traditional rehabilitative justification of juvenile justice 
systems. This Part provides background on juvenile offenders in the criminal 
justice system. Part II.A explores why children and teenagers have limited 
agency and competency. It also briefly discusses the prevalence of mental 
illness among juvenile offenders and its implications for agency and 
competency. Part II.B discusses the impact these characteristics have for 
traditional theories of punishment and concludes that juvenile justice systems 
should strive to embody the rehabilitative ideal. 
A. UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF JUVENILE AGENCY AND 
COMPETENCY 
Juvenile justice models internationally and in the United States broadly 
treat criminal justice as a binary system; offenders are either adult or juvenile 
actors. However, children are fundamentally different from teenagers, who 
are fundamentally different from adults. A binary system fails to take into 
account that the maturity of some child offenders should completely absolve 
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them of blame, while for many adolescents, their maturity should be a 
significant mitigating factor. These differences in maturity have substantial 
implications for whether or not juveniles should be subject to criminal 
sanctions. 
1. Dependency and Childhood 
Children are different from both adolescents and adults and lack the 
autonomy to ever justly be subject to criminal justice systems. Children lack 
the minimum capacity for blameworthiness and punishment.6 This was 
recognized at common law7 and has been codified into statutes domestically 
and internationally as the criminal age of responsibility.8 Children’s ability 
to make decisions, to process information, and to consider the consequences 
of alternative choices is significantly different from both adults and 
adolescents.9 
The transition between childhood and adolescence is marked by 
improved “intellectual, emotional, behavioral, and interpersonal 
functioning.”10 A gradual increase in logical reasoning abilities begins at 
around age eleven and continues through the age of sixteen.11 This increase 
in logical reasoning abilities includes the fundamental ability to 
“comprehend information relevant to a decision and . . . the ability to use this 
information logically to make a choice.”12 Simultaneously, focus on one’s 
peer group increases between the ages of ten and fourteen.13 As opposed to 
adolescents, who struggle to create their own independence, children do not 
consider autonomy a goal and “look to their parents to make decisions for 
them.”14 The low rate of childhood offenses reflects children’s inability to 
make independent decisions.15 Criminal offenses committed by children 
under the age of twelve are almost nonexistent.16 Children, who have not 
begun transitioning into adults and who are not autonomous individuals, 
 
 6 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 52 (2005) (reviewing the 
principles and policy implications of separate juvenile justice systems that are responsive to 
the unique implications of youth crime). 
 7 ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 130 
(2008). 
 8 See infra notes 110, 112, 116, 157–159, 172–173. 
 9 SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 130. 
 10 Id. at 33. 
 11 Id. at 34. 
 12 Id. at 36. 
 13 Id. at 34. 
 14 Id. at 31. 
 15 See ZIMRING, supra note 6, at 93. 
 16 See ZIMRING, supra note 6, at 93. 
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should not be subject to a criminal justice system that implicitly assumes 
some degree of autonomy. 
2. Adolescent Offenders as Limited Legal Actors 
In contrast, adolescence is a period of semi-autonomy that bridges the 
dependency of childhood and the independence of adulthood.17 It is marked 
by “puberty, the transition from elementary to secondary school, and the 
emergence of increasingly sophisticated reasoning abilities.”18 
Despite adolescents’ increased autonomy, modern-day science on 
juveniles’ physical and psychological development makes clear that 
adolescent offenders should also not be considered full legal actors.19 
Adolescent offenders lack the ability to be fully responsible for their actions 
because their behavior is “more likely to be shaped by developmental forces 
that are constitutive of adolescence” than by “subjectively defined 
preferences and values,” as found in adults.20 Areas of the brain that implicate 
“long-term planning, the regulation of emotion, and impulse control” are still 
developing in adolescents.21 Specifically, large-scale changes to the frontal 
lobe and prefrontal cortex, areas of the brain that are critical to advanced 
thinking, occur during an individual’s teenage years.22 As a result, 
“adolescents, as compared with adults, are more susceptible to influence, less 
future oriented, less risk averse, and less able to manage their impulses and 
behavior.”23 Since “these differences likely have a neurobiological basis,”24 
juvenile offenders have “greater prospects for reform,”25 “are not as morally 
reprehensible,”26 and are therefore “less deserving of the most severe 
punishments” than adults.27 
Adolescent offenders are also subject to psychological factors that 
reduce their culpability. Adolescence is marked by “psychosocial maturation 
 
 17 See id. at 42. 
 18 SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 34. 
 19 See Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation: How 
the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 12, 
27, 39–40 (2011). 
 20 Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 
AM. PSYCH. 1009, 1015 (2003). 
 21 Id. at 1013. 
 22 SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 44. 
 23 Steinberg & Scott, supra note 20, at 1013. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012). 
 26 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988). 
 27 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010). 
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and the maturation of the brain’s executive functions.”28 As a result, 
adolescent offenders are subject to factors that reduce their culpability that 
are nonexistent in adult offenders. First, adolescents are much more 
susceptible to peer pressure than adult offenders.29 Susceptibility to peer 
pressure increases between the ages of eleven and fourteen and peaks around 
the ages of fourteen and fifteen.30 Second, adolescents are also less future-
oriented than adults.31 Adolescents discount the future more heavily, and this 
leads adolescents to be less risk-averse.32 Finally, teenagers, as opposed to 
adults, are more impulsive and less able to control their behavior and 
choices.33 They have a greater tendency to moodiness and to seek sensation-
arousing situations.34 Collectively, these factors make juvenile delinquency 
less about moral blameworthiness or culpability and more about inherent 
psychological factors outside of an individual’s control. 
Decisions of the regional international courts and the United States 
Supreme Court have supported these scientific findings and recognized that 
a juvenile offender, owing to his or her developmental immaturity, should be 
viewed as less culpable than a comparable adult offender.35 The United States 
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that children under the age of 
eighteen are still developing and are therefore less culpable than adults.36 
 
 28 SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 34. 
 29 Id. at 38. 
 30 Id. at 34, 38. 
 31 Laurence Steinberg, Sandra Graham, Lia O’Brien, Jennifer Woolard, Elizabeth 
Cauffman & Marie Banich, Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 
CHILD DEV. 28, 28 (2009) (“Younger adolescents consistently demonstrate a weaker 
orientation to the future than do individuals aged 16 and older, as reflected in their greater 
willingness to accept a smaller reward delivered sooner than a larger one that is delayed, and 
in their characterizations of themselves as less concerned about the future and less likely to 
anticipate the consequences of their decisions.”). 
 32 Id. 
 33 SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 43. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See infra note 36; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (“[T]he Court has 
already endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a 
juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis for this conclusion is 
too obvious to require extended explanation. Inexperience, less education, and less 
intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct 
while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer 
pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and 
responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally 
reprehensible as that of an adult.”). 
 36 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 
261, 272 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 569–70 (2005). 
578 LAIRD [Vol. 111 
Outside the context of criminal justice, the Supreme Court has noted that “a 
child lacks [the] maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for 
making life’s difficult decisions.”37 More recently, in Miller v. Alabama, the 
Court struck down the sentencing of juvenile offenders to life without parole 
absent a review of mitigating factors.38 Justice Kagan observed that youth 
status is marked as a time of “immaturity, irresponsibility, ‘impetuousness, 
and recklessness.’”39 Similarly, in an advisory opinion, the IACHR stated 
that the principle that juvenile offenders require special measures “originates 
from the specific situation of children, taking into account their weakness, 
immaturity or inexperience.”40 Finally, the ECHR has held that the 
sentencing of juveniles “must be done with due regard for their presumed 
immaturity.”41 Because adolescents have limited competency and agency, 
juvenile justice systems should account for their youth status and recognize 
the physical and psychological factors that influence their actions. 
3. Juvenile Justice and Mental Illness 
Regardless of their age, juvenile offenders are very likely to suffer from 
mental illness and, therefore, be incompetent to stand trial.42 In the United 
States, “nearly 60% of male juvenile detainees and more than two-thirds of 
female detainees meet diagnostic criteria for one or more psychiatric 
disorders.”43 Furthermore, “[e]ducational researchers have found that 
upwards of 40 percent of incarcerated youth have a learning disability, and 
they will face significant challenges returning to school after they leave 
detention.”44 When we compare the mental illness prevalence rates of youths 
in the juvenile justice system to youths in the general population, the results 
are similarly skewed. Youths in the juvenile justice system are four times 
more likely to have a conduct disorder, roughly ten times more likely to have 
a substance abuse issue, and three to four times more likely to have an 
 
 37 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
 38 Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. 
 39 Id. at 476 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993)). 
 40 Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC‐17/02, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17, ¶ 60 (Aug. 28, 2002). 
 41 Khamtokhu v. Russia, Apps. Nos. 60367/08, 961/11, ¶ 80 (Jan. 24, 2017), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170663. 
 42 Michael L. Perlin, Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun: The International Human 
Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 301, 307 (2013). 
 43 Id. at 308. 
 44 BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF 
INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 2 (2006). 
2021] A BLUEPRINT FOR REHABILITATIVE REFORM 579 
affective disorder like clinical depression.45 And while young people may be 
more likely to have a behavioral health problem before being incarcerated, 
those behavioral health problems “simply get worse in detention, not 
better.”46 
The close correlation between mental illness and juvenile offenses goes 
to the heart of whether or not adolescent offenders are competent to stand 
trial—and the United States Supreme Court has differed from the ECHR on 
this matter. Under federal law, an incompetent defendant does not understand 
the “nature and consequences of the proceedings against him” or cannot 
“properly assist in his defense.”47 Therefore, if the majority of minors who 
commit crimes do so as a result of a mental illness, then they may not be 
competent to be judged for that crime.48 The Supreme Court has long held 
that insanity is a complete defense to criminal liability and that the Fifth 
Amendment requires an inquiry into a defendant’s insanity when it is in 
doubt.49 However, the Court has never required that the insanity defense be 
considered in juvenile justice systems, and some states do not even offer an 
insanity defense to juvenile offenders.50  
The ECHR, on the other hand, has taken a different approach. When the 
ECHR considered Germany’s diminished responsibility statute in a 2018 
case,51 it held that the defendant, a nineteen-year-old with severe sexual 
 
 45 Thomas Grisso, Juvenile Offenders and Mental Illness, 6 PSYCHIATRY PSYCH. & L. 143, 
147 (1999). 
 46 HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 44, at 8 (“Why is the prevalence of mental illness 
among detained youth so high? First, detention has become a new ‘dumping ground’ for young 
people with mental health issues . . . . At the same time, new laws were enacted that reduced 
judicial discretion to decide if youth would be detained, decreasing the system’s ability to 
screen out and divert youth with disorders.”); id. (“[T]he kind of environment generated in the 
nation’s detention centers, and the conditions of that confinement, conspire to create an 
unhealthy environment. Researchers have found that at least a third of detention centers are 
overcrowded, breeding an environment of violence and chaos for young people. Far from 
receiving effective treatment, young people with behavioral health problems simply get worse 
in detention, not better.”). 
 47 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). 
 48 See Perlin, supra note 42, at 315 (detailing the connection between mental illness, 
competency, and the insanity defense in the United States). 
 49 See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386 (1966) (“Having determined that 
Robinson’s constitutional rights were abridged by his failure to receive an adequate hearing 
on his competence to stand trial, we direct that the writ of habeas corpus must issue and 
Robinson be discharged, unless the State gives him a new trial within a reasonable time.”). 
 50 Perlin, supra note 42, at 313. 
 51 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], § 21, https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/
?p=752#21 [https://perma.cc/HDP5-3E4K] (Ger.) (“If the capacity of the perpetrator to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of the act or to act in accordance with such appreciation is 
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sadism who murdered a woman and was at a high risk of recidivism, could 
be continuously detained only for preventative, not punitive, reasons.52 The 
ECHR implicitly recognized what Germany had already codified: mental 
illness, while not always an exculpatory factor, may often be a mitigating 
factor. 
Children lack the autonomy or competency to be considered legal 
actors, and teenagers, while beginning to develop autonomy and competency, 
are limited legal actors. As Part I.B outlines, this has implications for the 
rationale behind juvenile justice systems and traditional theories of 
punishment. 
B. TRADITIONAL GOALS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND THEORIES OF 
PUNISHMENT 
The unique characteristics of adolescent offenders have significant 
implications for the rationale behind juvenile justice systems. The traditional 
theories of retributivism and deterrence generally fail to take into account the 
unique position of adolescent offenders. For this reason, the rehabilitative 
model serves as the primary goal of domestic and international juvenile 
justice systems. This Section will consider how traditional theories of 
retributivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation each align with the juveniles’ 
diminished competency and agency. 
1. Retributivism and Youth Offenders 
The retributive rationale for criminal justice is based on the Kantian idea 
of moral desert: we punish in order to preserve the dignity of the offender 
and to balance the moral scales.53 The rationale for retributive justice is 
dependent on a person’s free will and is fundamentally based on the idea of 
the full, rational actor.54 Put another way, “[p]unishment that gives an 
 
substantially diminished upon commission of the act due to one of the reasons indicated in 
section 20, then the punishment may be mitigated pursuant to Section 49 subsection (1).”). 
 52 Ilnseher v. Germany, Apps. Nos. 10211/12, 27505/14, ¶¶ 127–128 (Dec. 4, 2018), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-187540. 
 53 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (Mary 
Gregor ed. trans., 1997) (providing the philosophical foundation for retributive criminal 
justice systems). 
 54 Id. at 37–38 (“If, then, there is to be a supreme practical principle and, with respect to 
the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one such that, from the representation of 
what is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, it constitutes an objective 
principle of the will and thus can serve as a universal practical law. The ground of this principle 
is: rational nature exists as an end in itself . . . . The practical imperative will therefore be the 
following: So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”). 
2021] A BLUEPRINT FOR REHABILITATIVE REFORM 581 
offender what he or she deserves for a past crime is a valuable end in itself 
and needs no further justification.”55 However, any retributive model of 
criminal punishment must adjudicate desert in accordance with justice, and 
it precludes the punishment of individuals who are “not responsible for their 
offense.”56 
Retributive rationales have broadly been rejected as the basis for 
juvenile justice models. This is because a retributive basis for juvenile justice 
would “focus on backward-looking attributions of blame” for the action, 
rather than on the actor, which would make it “dangerously tempting [to 
abolish] the juvenile court.”57 Instead, the existence of a separate juvenile 
justice system “recogniz[es] the diminished blameworthiness of juveniles” 
and undermines the retributive justification for punishment.58 The Supreme 
Court recognized this diminished blameworthiness in Roper v. Simmons, 
holding that as a result of “the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender,” the 
death penalty was impermissible.59 Similarly, the ECHR, in V. v. United 
Kingdom, affirmed the language, adopted by the United Nations, that any 
retributive goals of juvenile justice be outweighed by the rehabilitative 
interests in “safeguarding the well-being and future of the young person.”60 
2. Societal Deterrence and Recidivism 
The deterrence considerations normally at play in criminal justice 
systems also do not apply well in juvenile systems. Incarcerating some 
adolescents will generally not impact the decision-making of other teenagers 
or have any impact on the overall offense rate.61 As the Supreme Court has 
 
 55 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 454 
(1997). 
 56 Id. at 477. 
 57 Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The Fourth Option, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 34 (2009). A retributive rationale for juvenile justice would make it easy to 
abolish the entire system because in a retributive model, there is no reason to distinguish 
between adult and juvenile actors. In other words, when the focus of criminal justice is 
punishing past actions as an independently valuable end, the focus is on the action, not the 
actor. See id. (“Treatment of juvenile offenders is not necessarily ignored, but it is not 
necessary to, and in a sense is a distraction from, assigning culpability and assuring 
accountability for one’s offenses.”). 
 58 Id. at 35. 
 59 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
 60 V. v. United Kingdom, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 111, 135. The dissenting opinion went 
even further and found the sentence in the instant case impermissible because the “principal 
reason for bringing these proceedings against children of eleven years of age was retribution 
[and] vengeance is not a form of justice and in particular vengeance against children in a 
civilised society should be completely excluded.” Id. at 172. 
 61 See infra note 64. 
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recognized, this is because of three major differences between children and 
adults: (1) juveniles tend to engage in reckless behavior due to their general 
lack of maturity, which is still developing; (2) minors are more susceptible 
to the influence of peer pressure; and (3) minors’ character traits are in the 
process of development and are more likely to change over time than those 
of adults.62 As a result, adolescents will not accurately assess the risks of their 
chosen course of action. However, incarceration is not designed to address 
any of the three major reasons why a teenager might commit a crime. It is no 
surprise, then, that “decades of research show incarceration to be the least 
effective, most expensive option in treating delinquency.”63 
Similarly, reducing recidivism in the general population cannot be 
addressed by incarceration in juvenile justice systems. This is primarily 
because, for the majority of crimes, adolescents are not likely to reoffend.64 
Instead, their tendency to commit most crimes peaks around the age of 
sixteen and then dramatically decreases from the age of seventeen onward, 
independent of whether or not they are incarcerated for their crimes.65 These 
relatively common “phase-specific” offenses are concentrated in 
adolescents’ teenage years and include offenses like arson (ages thirteen and 
fourteen), motor vehicle theft (age sixteen), larceny (age seventeen), and 
burglary (age eighteen).66 Incarceration adds nothing to the natural 
development of an adolescent’s brain, which already makes recidivism 
unlikely. 
The exceptions to this “age-crime relationship” are particularly violent 
crimes, like rape, homicide, and assault.67 The peak age for committing these 
more violent offenses is later, and the drop-off in offense rates is much more 
gradual.68 The peak age for homicide is nineteen, for rape it is twenty, and 
for aggravated assault it is twenty-one.69 Youth offense rates of these violent 
crimes are also much lower than phase-specific offenses.70 “While the ratio 
of homicide arrests at age fifteen to age twenty-three is .4, the ratio of auto 
 
 62 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70; see also infra Part II.A. 
 63 David J. Utter & Megan Hougard, Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana: Redefining the 
Role of the Advocate, 50 LA. B.J. 99, 99 (2002). 
 64 SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 52–53. 
 65 See id. 
 66 ZIMRING, supra note 6, at 92. 
 67 Id. at 91, 93. 
 68 Id. at 91. 
 69 Id. at 92. 
 70 Id. 
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theft arrests at age fifteen to age twenty-three is 3.67.”71 The ephemeral 
nature of phase-specific offenses, like property-related violations, suggests 
that they are symptomatic of the conditions of adolescence rather than 
indicative of a permanent adult characteristic.72 Recidivism concerns that 
could be addressed by incarceration in an adult criminal justice system do 
not exist for most adolescent offenses. Any deterrence rationale for a juvenile 
incarceration model would only apply to the small, limited group of violent 
offenses like rape and murder that could be indicative of a more permanent 
condition. 
3. Rehabilitation, Education, Treatment, and Diversion 
In contrast to the traditional retribution and deterrence theories of 
punishment, rehabilitation has traditionally been considered the foundation 
of juvenile justice in the United States and abroad.73 This is because the 
“uniqueness of immaturity as a mitigating condition argues for . . . a separate 
justice system, in which rehabilitation is a central aim.”74 Social reformers 
during the late 1800s believed “that juveniles, unlike adults, were not 
responsible for their behavior.”75 As a result, reformers designed juvenile 
courts as social welfare agencies that were distinct from adult criminal courts, 
which focused on punishment.76 These courts embraced the rehabilitative 
model, which focuses on “the notions that children[] are dependent upon 
adults; are developing emotionally, morally, and cognitively and, therefore, 
are psychologically impressionable and behaviorally malleable; and have 
different, less competent, levels of understanding and collateral mental 
functioning than adults.”77 
Today, the rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice systems have been 
reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court, the Council of Europe, and 
the ECHR. The Supreme Court has long recognized the value of 
 
 71 Id. at 94. In other words, there are .4 homicides committed by a fifteen-year-old for 
every homicide committed by a twenty-three-year-old. And there are 3.67 auto thefts 
committed by a fifteen-year-old for every auto theft committed by a twenty-three-year-old. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See generally A Madman’s Vacation, SERIAL (Nov. 2018), https://serialpodcast.org/seas
on-three/8/a-madmans-vacation [https://perma.cc/2YBM-GA8R] (discussing the rationale for 
juvenile justice systems overall). 
 74 Steinberg & Scott, supra note 20, at 1016. 
 75 Ira M. Schwartz, Neil Alan Weiner & Guy Enosh, Nine Lives and Then Some: Why the 
Juvenile Court Does Not Roll over and Die, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 535 (1998). 
 76 See id. 
 77 Id. 
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rehabilitative justice for juvenile offenders.78 In Graham v. Florida,79 the 
Court struck down life without parole sentences for children convicted of 
nonhomicide offenses because life without parole “forswears altogether the 
rehabilitative ideal” and “[w]hat the State must do . . . is give defendants like 
Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”80 Similarly, the ECHR has stated 
that member states have an obligation to facilitate the rehabilitation and 
reintegration of juvenile delinquents.81 It has also noted that the abolition of 
life imprisonment in member states is rooted in a desire to “facilitate the 
rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents.”82 The Council of Europe has also 
reiterated rehabilitative goals when children are deprived of liberty. In the 
Guidelines on Child-Friendly Justice, the Committee of Ministers stated that 
the incarceration of children should be focused on “reintegration into 
society.”83 The Guidelines also state that juveniles should have “regular and 
meaningful contact with parents;” “receive appropriate education, vocational 
guidance and training, medical care;” and have access to “programmes that 
prepare children in advance for their return to their communities.”84 The 
rehabilitative ideals of juvenile justice have been repeatedly affirmed by the 
Supreme Court, the Council of Europe, and the ECHR. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Countries around the world have developed juvenile justice systems 
with unique characteristics in an attempt to embody the rehabilitative ideal 
of juvenile justice. This Part will review some of these systems. Part II.A will 
review rehabilitative aspects of juvenile justice systems that have been 
established by the ECHR, the IACtHR, and member states in the Council of 
Europe and the Organization of American States in the wake of the CRC. 
Specific focus will be placed on the role of incarceration of juvenile 
offenders. Part II.A will also broadly review juvenile justice systems in the 
United States and show that instead of embodying a rehabilitative idea of 
juvenile justice that is aligned with modern-day psychiatry and neurology, 
 
 78 See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (“The objectives [of Juvenile 
Courts] are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for 
society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment.”). 
 79 560 U.S. 48 (2015). 
 80 Id. at 74–75; see also Green, supra note 19, at 11. 
 81 Khamtokhu v. Russia, Apps. Nos. 60367/08, 961/11, ¶ 80 (Jan. 24, 2017), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170663 [https://perma.cc/3NRT-EVAH]. 
 82 Maslov v. Austria, 2008-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 301, 331. 
 83 GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 24. 
 84 Id. 
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they reflect retributive principles from the 1980s. Finally, Part II.B will 
propose that the United States shed its current juvenile criminal justice 
systems in favor of systems that draw on various international models and 
minimize the incarceration of adolescents by (1) raising the age of criminal 
responsibility; (2) creating a tiered system for teenagers with varying degrees 
of competency; (3) significantly restricting incarceration options; (4) 
investing in alternative options that divert youth offenders from the juvenile 
justice system; and (5) reimagining juvenile detention centers as 
rehabilitative resources that provide rigorous educational and psychological 
services. 
A. JUVENILE INCARCERATION MODELS INTERNATIONALLY AND IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
1. The Council of Europe and its Member States 
The Council of Europe is Europe’s “oldest political body” and focuses 
on protecting democracy and human rights within member states.85 It was 
founded in the wake of World War II in 1949 and today consists of forty-
seven members states.86 The Council of Europe executes the judgments of 
the ECHR and ensures that members states comply with the European 
Convention on Human Rights.87 This sub-section explores how the Council 
of Europe and various member states, including the United Kingdom, various 
Scandinavian countries, and Turkey, have structured their juvenile justice 
systems. 
 a. The Council of Europe and the ECHR 
In 2010, the Council of Europe adopted the Guidelines on Child-
Friendly Justice.88 The Guidelines focus on “the best interests of children” 
and dictate that “member states should make . . . concerted efforts to 
establish multidisciplinary approaches” to juvenile justice.89 The Guidelines 
also echo the CRC and establish that juvenile incarceration should only be 
used as a last resort.90 Furthermore, they emphasize “the importance of 
family ties and promoting the reintegration into society” and dictate that 
 
 85 What Is The Council of Europe?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/new
s/world-europe-17741526 [https://perma.cc/U83K-UE48]. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id.; see also THE COURT IN BRIEF, EUROPEAN CT. OF HUM. RTS., https://www.echr.coe.
int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRU8-QUFU]. 
 88 GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 7. 
 89 Id. at 18. 
 90 Id. at 24. 
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children should be able to “maintain regular and meaningful contact with 
parents”; “receive appropriate education, vocational guidance and training, 
medical care, and . . . access to leisure, including physical education and 
sport.”91 The Guidelines also demand that the age of responsibility be 
reasonable and that alternatives to incarceration, such as mediation and 
diversion, be encouraged.92 In many ways, the Guidelines provide details for 
what the ECHR has already decided and simply “serve as a practical guide 
for [member] states to implement international standards.”93 
In several cases, the ECHR has emphasized that adolescents’ immutable 
limited agency and competency must be considered for countries to embody 
rehabilitative ideals of juvenile justice. As one example, in 1999, the ECHR 
invalidated the United Kingdom’s criminal adjudication of an eleven-year-
old child.94 The Court held that it was “essential that a child charged with an 
offence [be] dealt with in a manner which takes full account of his age, level 
of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities.”95 Similarly, in 2006, 
after Turkish authorities detained a sixteen-year-old for four months while 
his case was pending, the ECHR held that, since the authorities did not 
consider the unique status of the offender as a minor, the detention was 
unlawful.96 
The ECHR also considers an offender’s age outside the context of 
incarceration. In Maslov v. Austria, the ECHR overturned an expulsion order 
of a sixteen-year-old adolescent who had committed a variety of criminal 
offenses and held that “the decisive feature of the present case is the young 
age at which the applicant committed the offences.”97 The ECHR reached 
this conclusion because it determined that the non-violent property-related 
acts committed by the minor could still be “regarded as acts of juvenile 
delinquency” rather than violent crimes that might justify an expulsion 
order.98 Finally, where the ECHR considered whether a ten-year-old received 
a fair hearing, the court focused on the applicant’s immaturity and the 
“considerable psychiatric evidence” that suggested that the applicant “found 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 25. However, the Guidelines refrain from setting a minimum age and do not 
establish a definition for “reasonable.” See generally id. 
 93 Ton Liefaard, Child-Friendly Justice: Protection and Participation of Children in the 
Justice System, 88 TEMP. L REV. 905, 907 (2016). 
 94 T. v. United Kingdom, App No. 24724/94, ¶ 84 (Dec. 16, 1999), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-58593. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Selçuk v. Turkey, App. No. 21768/02, ¶¶ 34–37 (Jan. 10, 2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-71944. 
 97 Maslov v. Austria, 2008-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 301, 304. 
 98 Id. at 327. 
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it very difficult and distressing to think or talk about the events in question, 
making it impossible to ascertain many aspects.”99 The ECHR has 
consistently emphasized the adolescence of juvenile offenders, the 
relationship between immaturity and limited intellectual and emotional 
capacities, and the rehabilitative ideals of juvenile justice. 
However, despite this rhetoric, the ECHR has refrained from taking 
substantive steps to curtail the punitive juvenile justice systems of some of 
its member states. For instance, in V. v. United Kingdom, a ten-year-old boy 
convicted of murder claimed that, under Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the United Kingdom was precluded from 
enforcing a criminal age of responsibility for a ten-year-old without ensuring 
that procedures and sentences be modified to reflect the age of the child.100 
The ECHR rejected the argument, holding that “there is [not] at this stage 
any clear common standard amongst the member States of the Council of 
Europe as to the minimum age of criminal responsibility.”101 Therefore, “the 
attribution of criminal responsibility to the applicant does not in itself give 
rise to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention.”102 The ECHR’s abdication 
of its responsibility to protect adolescent offenders has allowed punitive 
juvenile justice systems to remain in the United Kingdom.103 
The ECHR has been more active, though not steadfast, in regulating the 
length of juvenile prison sentences. In T. v. United Kingdom, the ECHR held 
that “a policy which ignores at any stage the child’s development and 
 
 99 V. v. United Kingdom, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 111, 148. V. and T. were co-defendants 
convicted of murder in the United Kingdom in 1999. See supra note 94. 
 100 Id. ¶ 86. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the prohibition of 
torture, dictates that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.” Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 E.T.S. 5, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Conventio
n_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T29-5LSU]. 
 101 V., 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 144. 
 102 Id. The ECHR noted that Cyprus, Ireland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland all set the 
criminal age of responsibility at seven, while Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg all set the 
criminal age of responsibility at eighteen. Id. at 137. 
 103 International criminal courts have also refrained from exercising jurisdiction over 
children, in effect regulating juvenile prosecution to nation states and making the ECHR’s 
abdication of responsibility even more egregious. The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) excludes persons under the age of eighteen from the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 26, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544. 
Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia have 
refrained from setting a minimum age of criminal responsibility, though they have also 
refrained from indicting anyone under the age of eighteen. Matthew Happold, The Age of 
Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 69, 76 (Karin Arts & Vesselin Popovski eds., 
2006). 
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progress while in custody as a factor relevant to his eventual release date is 
an unlawful policy.”104 Similarly, in Hussain v. The United Kingdom, the 
ECHR held that without the use of a tariff105 to reevaluate his prison sentence, 
the applicant, because he was a sixteen-year-old boy, would be 
impermissibly detained.106 
The ECHR has also developed loose standards for the detention of 
minors with mental health issues. As a preliminary matter, before children 
can be detained, “a medical assessment should be made of the child’s state 
of health to determine whether or not he or she can be placed in a juvenile 
detention centre.”107 This principle was illustrated in a case where the ECHR 
found that Russia had violated the rights of a twelve-year-old boy with 
ADHD and neurosis who was hospitalized immediately after being released 
from a temporary detention center because he was “not given the necessary 
treatment for his condition at the temporary detention centre.”108 However, 
in the same way it has neglected to set a clear minimum age of criminal 
responsibility for its member states, the ECHR has failed to describe, beyond 
a prohibition on juvenile life sentences without parole, a maximum detention 
length for juvenile offenders. 
 b. The United Kingdom 
The ECHR’s deferential treatment of member states has allowed some 
countries wide latitude to maintain primarily retributive, rather than 
rehabilitative, juvenile justice systems. For instance, the United Kingdom, 
despite criticism from the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human 
Rights,109 has lower ages of criminal responsibility110 and more incarcerated 
 
 104 Marina Ann Magnuson, Taking Lives: How the United States Has Violated the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights by Sentencing Juveniles to Life Without 
Parole, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 163, 174 n.48 (2010). 
 105 A tariff in the British system serves a similar function as parole in American systems. 
Id. at 174 n.50. 
 106 Hussain v. United Kingdom, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 252, 269. 
 107 Blokhin v. Russia, App. No. 47152/06, ¶ 138 (Mar. 23, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.i
nt/eng?i=001-161822. 
 108 Id. ¶¶ 146, 149. 
 109 Thomas Hammarberg, A Juvenile Justice Approach Built on Human Rights Principles, 
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 110 Barry Goldson & John Muncie, Rethinking Youth Justice: Comparative Analysis, 
International Human Rights and Research Evidence, 6 YOUTH JUST. 91, 95 (2006) (“12 in 
Canada, the Netherlands and Turkey; 13 in France; 14 in Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand 
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youth offenders than most other European Countries.111 The age of criminal 
responsibility is eight in Scotland and ten in England, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland.112 However, in Wales and England, the prosecutor has the burden of 
proving that juvenile offenders between the ages of ten and fourteen knew 
their actions were wrong.113 These harsher punishments reflect the 
importance placed on deterrence and retribution in the juvenile justice system 
in the U.K.114 Admittedly, the United Kingdom has also adopted 
rehabilitative concepts into its incarceration model. Section 53(1) of the 
Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 requires that “[u]ntil the age of 
eighteen a child or young person detained . . . will be held at a children’s 
home or other institution providing facilities appropriate to his age.”115 
Nonetheless, the British model’s retributive and punitive elements are often 
under reproach from the ECHR as out of line with international norms of 
juvenile justice. 
 c. Scandinavia 
The antithesis of the British model has been adopted uniformly by the 
four Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. In all 
four countries, the age of criminal responsibility is fifteen years.116 
Additionally, while none of these countries have a separate juvenile court 
system, youth offenders between the ages of fifteen and seventeen are 
supported by both the criminal justice and child welfare systems.117 
Significantly, all four countries restrict the charges that can be brought 
against youth offenders.118 
 
and Spain; 15 in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden; and 18 in Belgium and 
Luxembourg.”). 
 111 Id. at 92 (“[T]he defining hallmark of contemporary youth justice in England and 
Wales is a ‘new punitiveness’, characterized by rates of child imprisonment significantly 
exceeding those found in most other industrialized democratic countries in the world.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 112 Id. at 95. 
 113 V. v. United Kingdom, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 111, 128. 
 114 Goldson & Muncie, supra note 110, at 99 (“Youth justice policies are increasingly 
located within a wider ideological context whereby social, economic and political problems 
are redefined as issues to be managed rather than resolved.”); see also V., 1999-IX Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at 125 (noting that in the sentencing of two ten-year-old boys for murder, the trial judge 
“subsequently recommended that a period of eight years be served by the boys to satisfy the 
requirements of retribution and deterrence”). 
 115 V., 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 130. 
 116 Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Penal Policy in Scandinavia, 36 CRIME & JUST. 217, 225 (2007). 
 117 Id. at 226. For instance, Sweden uses social welfare authorities, rather than criminal 
justice officials, to administer court-ordered institutional treatment. Id. 
 118 See id. 
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Furthermore, in the majority of cases, all four countries use alternatives 
to incarceration to resolve youth offenses. Probation and fines are the most 
common sanctions for youth offenders.119 In Norway, mediation is frequently 
used as an independent criminal sanction to resolve offenses.120 Denmark 
uses “youth contract” programs and “youth sanction” programs.121 “Youth 
contract” programs obligate youths to participate in certain activities, which 
if they complete, lead to the dropping of the charges and in some cases, a 
suspended sentence. “Youth sanction” programs are “two-year programs 
imposed by courts but implemented by [] social welfare authorities.”122 
As a result, juvenile offenders are incarcerated far less frequently in 
these countries. Finland, for example, only allows non-suspended prison 
terms for youth offenders in extraordinary circumstances.123 Countrywide, 
this has led to “about 100 (2 per 100,000) prisoners between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty and fewer than ten (0.2 per 100,000) in the fifteen to 
seventeen age group.”124 Similarly, in Sweden, “[p]rison is seldom used for 
the age group fifteen to seventeen (five cases in 2003), and it is relatively rare 
in the age group eighteen to twenty (767 in 2003).”125 At the heart of all four 
of these systems are principles of rehabilitative justice that aim to reduce 
recidivism and address the underlying issues without reverting to societal 
condemnation. 
 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. Norway was the first Scandinavian country to begin using mediation in 1981. Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id.; ANETTE STORGAARD, INT’L JUV. JUST. OBSERVATORY, ALTERNATIVES TO CUSTODY 
FOR YOUNG OFFENDERS: NATIONAL REPORT ON JUV. JUSTICE TRENDS DENMARK, 4–5 (2011). 
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closed juvenile institution and then in an open residential institution. Id. at 6–7. However, both 
centers are administered by welfare, rather than penal, institutions. Id. 
 123 Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 116, at 236. Non-suspended prison terms are generally 
reserved for “homicides, aggravated robberies and aggravated drug offences.” TAPIO LAPPI-
SEPPA ̈LA ̈, INT’L JUV. JUST. OBSERVATORY, ALTERNATIVES TO CUSTODY FOR YOUNG 
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 124 Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 116, at 236. 
 125 Id. at 249. 
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d. Turkey and “Open Prisons” 
Finally, Turkey, which reformed its juvenile criminal justice system 
over the last twenty years, provides a model for reformation of juvenile penal 
institutions in the twenty-first century.126 Turkey’s transition towards a more 
rehabilitative juvenile justice system began with the passage of Turkey’s 
Juvenile Protection Law in 2005, which aimed to “regulate the procedures 
and principles with regard to protecting juveniles who are in need of 
protection or who are pushed to crime, and ensuring their rights and well-
being.”127 In using the phrase “pushed to crime,” Turkey makes it clear that 
it fundamentally views juvenile offenders as victims, rather than perpetrators. 
However, Turkey retained punitive characteristics in its juvenile justice 
system. Even though it was raised to twelve, Turkey still maintains a low age 
of criminal responsibility.128 Similarly to those in the United Kingdom, 
adolescent offenders between the ages of twelve and fifteen are evaluated by 
a forensic specialist who determines whether the child understood that what 
they were doing was wrong.129 Turkey also often detains juveniles during 
pretrial proceedings.130 
Nevertheless, Turkey manages to maintain a low recidivism rate 
because it detains relatively few children, and the children who are detained 
are kept in “open prisons,” which “allows for juveniles to experience more 
successful rehabilitation than they might otherwise receive in closed 
facilities.”131 Turkey’s “open prisons” more closely resemble boarding 
schools than traditional detention centers and are used primarily for serious 
offenders.132 They emphasize education, practical work experience, physical 
fitness, and community service.133 The “open prisons” do not have fences or 
barriers, and detainees attend school, training sessions, or have jobs in the 
local community.134 Residents may spend the weekend or an afternoon 
 
 126 Brenda McKinney & Lauren Salins, A Decade of Progress: Promising Models for 
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visiting family.135 Because the living conditions in these prisons are often 
better than living conditions at home, residents rarely attempt to leave or 
escape.136 These prisons prepare children for life after detention, and 
recidivism rates are thus lower among previously incarcerated teenagers in 
Turkey than in other countries.137 Turkey’s open-air prisons emphasize 
rehabilitative programs, and teenagers are able to grow into productive 
members of society that no longer pose a threat to public safety. 
2. The Organization of American States and Latin America 
Like the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States (OAS) 
is a regional international body that focuses on promoting democracy and 
protecting human rights.138 Within the OAS, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR) is responsible for promoting and protecting 
human rights.139 And like the ECHR, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR) is an autonomous judicial body that enforces the human 
rights conventions adopted by OAS member states.140 This sub-section will 
review how the IACHR and IACtHR have articulated and enforced principles 
of juvenile justice. It will also review the system developed by Oaxaca, 
Mexico, one of the OAS members states. 
a. The IACHR and the IACtHR 
Since the passage of the CRC, many Latin American countries have 
reformed their juvenile justice systems.141 The IACHR has consistently 
recognized that the primary goal of the juvenile justice system is 
rehabilitation.142 With regard to the minimum age of criminal responsibility, 
the IACHR provides more guidance than its European counterpart.143 While 
the IACHR has refrained from setting a specific age of criminal responsibility 
and acknowledges that there is no clear international standard, it also says 
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that any criminal age of responsibility below twelve is unacceptable.144 
Additionally, it notes that “the Committee on the Rights of the Child has 
recommended that States set the minimum at between 14 and 16 years.”145 
In contrast to the British and Turkish systems, the IACHR specifically 
condemns the use of a tiered model that recognizes multiple criminal ages of 
responsibility, coupled with a determination of maturity, as “confusing.”146 
Among member states, Argentina has the highest age of responsibility at 
sixteen, while Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago have the lowest age of 
responsibility among member states at seven.147 
The IACtHR has also disavowed punitive rationales for juvenile 
punishment and embraced rehabilitative principles. In an advisory opinion 
requested by the IACHR, the IACtHR supported the principle that “children 
requir[e] measures to protect their rights [and] must not be subject to punitive 
treatment. On the contrary, they require prompt and careful intervention on 
the part of well‐equipped and well‐staffed institutions in order to resolve their 
problems or mitigate their consequences.”148 Even more notably, in Juvenile 
Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, the IACtHR found Paraguay in violation 
of several conventions due to their treatment of juvenile prisoners.149 The 
country’s “Panchito López” Center, which housed juvenile prisoners, was 
constantly suffering from “overpopulation, overcrowding, lack of sanitation, 
inadequate infrastructure, and a prison guard staff that was both too small 
and poorly trained.”150 Additionally, Paraguay failed to keep juvenile 
offenders under the age of eighteen separated from adult prisoners when a 
series of fires required officials to send juvenile prisoners to adult prisons all 
over the country.151 The IACtHR found the State of Paraguay in violation of 
Articles 4(1), 5(1), 5(2), 5(6), and 19 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights when it determined that Paraguay failed to provide “decent living 
 
 144 INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., supra note 4, at 13. 
 145 Id. 
 146 INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., supra note 4, at 14–15. The IACHR also noted that 
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OC‐17/02, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17 (Aug. 28, 2002)). 
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conditions, rehabilitative programs, and care to children in State custody.”152 
Finally, the IACtHR, while recognizing that in practice many member states 
fall woefully short, reaffirmed the CRC’s language that incarceration “must 
be used only as a last resort and only by way of exception, and for as short a 
time as possible.”153 Thus, the IACHR and IACtHR have consistently 
promoted rehabilitative principles of juvenile justice. 
b. Mexico and Oaxaca 
Upon ratification of the CRC, the Mexican government amended its 
constitution and directed its states to develop juvenile justice systems in 
accordance with the principles outlined in the CRC.154 In anticipation of the 
amendment, Oaxaca, a state to the southwest of Mexico City, developed a 
system that served as a model for the rest of the country.155 Oaxaca, due to 
cultural norms156 and the financial and geographic constraints of the region, 
emphasized rehabilitative principles in Oaxaca’s Penal Code for 
Adolescents, which was passed in 2007.157 
 
 152 Ava Rubin, Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, 38 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMPAR. L. REV. 1446, 1455–56 (2016); see also Juvenile Reeducation Inst., Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶¶ 176, 340. Article 4(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights 
states, “[e]very person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by 
law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his life.” American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), Nov. 22, 1969, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
95-21, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. Article 5(1) is “[e]very person has the right to have his physical, 
mental, and moral integrity respected”; 5(2) states, “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty 
shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”; and 5(6) states 
“[p]unishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform 
and social readaptation of the prisoners.” Id. art. 5. Article 19 states, “[e]very minor child has 
the right to the measures of protection required by his condition as a minor on the part of his 
family, society, and the state.” Id. art. 19. 
 153 Juvenile Reeducation Inst., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 231; INTER-AM. 
COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., supra note 4, at 22. 
 154 Beth Caldwell, Punishment v. Restoration: A Comparative Analysis of Juvenile 
Delinquency Law in the United States and Mexico, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 105, 
109 (2011) (“In 2005, Article 18 of the Mexican Constitution was modified to require each 
state to design and implement a juvenile delinquency system that operates separately from the 
adult criminal justice system.”). 
 155 Id. at 112 (“Oaxaca has received national attention for the extent to which mediation 
and restorative justice processes are utilized to address juvenile crime. Because of this 
innovative approach, Oaxaca’s Penal Code for Adolescents has been referred to as a model 
for other states.”). 
 156 Id. at 115 (“The prevalence of indigenous people and cultures in Oaxaca contributes 
to a world-view that prioritizes dialogue and community responses to problems that are similar 
in many ways to restorative justice conferences.”). 
 157 Id. at 115, 112 n.35. 
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Instead of setting a single age of criminal responsibility that would 
determine when a child could be detained, Oaxaca created a tiered approach. 
The Oaxacan Penal Code excludes any children younger than twelve from 
the juvenile criminal justice system.158 From twelve until fourteen, children 
may be held criminally accountable, but detention is prohibited.159 Finally, 
from ages fourteen until eighteen, children may be incarcerated if convicted 
of a limited list of crimes.160 However, fourteen to sixteen-year-olds may 
only be incarcerated for a maximum of four years, and seventeen to eighteen-
year-olds may only be incarcerated for a maximum of seven to ten years.161 
These tiers were designed to track with a youth’s “capacity to understand the 
wrongfulness of their actions and to engage in higher order reasoning.”162 As 
of January 2010, Oaxaca only had thirty-five youth offenders incarcerated.163 
3. The United States 
Illinois pioneered rehabilitative juvenile justice when it set up the first 
juvenile justice system in 1899.164 Within twenty-five years, all but two states 
had adopted similar systems.165 However, during the 1980s, the United States 
moved from a rehabilitative approach to juvenile justice to a system focused 
on retributive justice.166 This followed a national trend towards more punitive 
criminal justice models and marked the most substantial growth in youth 
imprisonment in the history of American crime policy.167 Between 1971 and 
1995, the incarceration rate of juveniles increased by over forty percent.168 
Today, the United States’ juvenile incarceration rate remains “five times 
higher than South Africa . . . seven times greater than England and Wales, 
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thirteen times greater than Australia, eighteen times greater than France, and 
over three thousand times greater than Japan.”169 
The United States’ high juvenile incarceration rate is not the only thing 
that makes it stand out in the criminal justice context. It was not until 2005 
that the United States Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders violated the Eighth Amendment.170 Furthermore, despite the limits 
imposed by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama,171 juvenile life without 
parole remains legal in the United States to this day.172 Among the states, 
only nineteen have minimum ages of criminal responsibility.173 The lowest 
minimum age is seven in Oklahoma, and both Nevada and Washington 
consider eight the minimum age of criminal responsibility.174 And as of 2007, 
forty-six states had waiver laws that allowed states to prosecute minors as 
adults, either through categorical exclusions for certain offenses or through 
prosecutorial discretion.175 
Additionally, while juvenile offenders are often separated from adult 
offenders, this is frequently at the discretion of judges, and juvenile detention 
 
 169 Jacqueline L. Bullard & Kimberly E. Dvorchak, Juvenile Appeals: A Promising Legal 
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 171 576 U.S. 460 (2012). 
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 173 Linda A. Szymanski, Do States Set a Minimum Age, Below Which a Juvenile Cannot 
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recidivism. Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to 
Delinquency?, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Off. of Juv. Just. & Delinquency Prevention, Wash. D.C.), 
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2021] A BLUEPRINT FOR REHABILITATIVE REFORM 597 
facilities mirror adult facilities.176 Since 2000, twenty-two states and the 
District of Columbia have all documented instances of maltreatment of 
juvenile prisoners, including “systemic violence, [physical and sexual] 
abuse, and excessive use of isolation or restraints.”177 Even in model juvenile 
detention systems, such as Ohio’s, access to rehabilitation resources are 
limited, and gangs may control the rehabilitative resources.178 Finally, 
although children might be initially charged with abbreviated sentences, they 
will often also be charged with a suspended adult sentence if they misbehave 
in prison.179 Despite recent decisions by the Supreme Court, the United 
States’ juvenile justice systems remain uniquely punitive and fail to embody 
rehabilitative ideals. 
B. THE PROPER JUVENILE INCARCERATION MODEL FOR THE UNITED 
STATES 
In light of the unique issues of competency that plague juvenile criminal 
justice and the rehabilitative rationale that it recognizes as the core of the 
juvenile justice system, the United States’ punitive systems provide 
inadequate protections for youth when compared to the systems adopted by 
many member states in the Council of Europe and the Organization of 
American States. In order to move their juvenile justice systems into the 
twenty-first century so that they better reflect rehabilitative ideals and the 
modern-day scientific consensus regarding children and adolescents, states 
should reform their juvenile justice systems by (1) establishing a statutory 
minimum criminal age of responsibility no lower than twelve that precludes 
children without some degree of autonomy from entering the juvenile justice 
system; (2) installing a tiered sentencing structure that reflects the growth of 
autonomy and culpability experienced by adolescents throughout their 
teenage years to guide the discretion of individual judges; (3) restricting the 
number of crimes for which incarceration is a sentencing option to those 
violent crimes that are not phase-specific violations unique to the adolescent 
experience; (4) creating additional diversionary programs that emphasize 
community service, education, and physical and mental fitness without 
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requiring incarceration; and (5) restricting the incarceration of juvenile 
offenders to special reform prisons that emphasize rehabilitative ideals.  
1. A Responsible Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility 
A minimum age of criminal responsibility of twelve reflects the modern 
scientific consensus that until their preteen years, children do not strive to be 
autonomous and are dependent on their parents.180 It reflects the data that 
children twelve and younger commit significantly fewer crimes than 
adolescents.181 It also reflects the age when teenagers begin to become 
independent, rationally thinking members of society, and it lines up with 
other significant transitions that occur during childhood: the development of 
an outside social group that exerts peer pressure, puberty, and the transition 
from elementary to secondary schooling.182 
A minimum criminal age of responsibility of twelve also allows states 
to realize the rehabilitative ideals of the juvenile justice system by keeping 
children too young to have any degree of culpability from entering the 
system.183 It recognizes the transitory nature of childhood and prevents the 
criminal justice system from having jurisdiction over people without 
agency.184 It also reflects the growing international consensus that any 
criminal age of responsibility below twelve is too low. The IACHR, for 
instance has explicitly recognized that any criminal age of responsibility 
below twelve is too low.185 And although the ECHR has notably abdicated 
its responsibility to set a minimum age for its member states, even that court 
has recognized that age is a crucial element of a juvenile’s competency to 
stand trial.186 Additionally, the majority of member states in the Council of 
Europe have set the criminal age of responsibility at or above the age of 
twelve.187 In many instances, member states, such as the Scandinavian 
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countries, have actually set the age of criminal responsibility even higher in 
order to better reflect their interpretation of the rehabilitative rationale for 
juvenile justice.188 In order to better reflect the international norms governing 
the treatment of children and to better protect children from the jurisdiction 
of the criminal justice system, states should set a minimum criminal age of 
responsibility of at least twelve years old. 
2. A Tiered Approach 
It is also clear that once a person turns twelve, they are not immediately 
fully autonomous individuals. Instead, adolescents go through a period of 
semi-autonomy, beginning in their preteen years and continuing until 
adulthood.189 The competency of an individual will always be an 
individualized investigation. As a result, a blanket approach for all teenagers 
with regard to competency would be too rigid. However, a tiered approach 
to the sentence lengths for juveniles would provide more relevant sentencing 
parameters for judges evaluating juvenile competency. 
Oaxaca, Mexico, provides a clear example for states seeking to create a 
tiered sentencing structure for adolescent offenders. Oaxaca has a minimum 
criminal age of responsibility at twelve, but three separate sentencing tiers 
for twelve to fourteen-year-olds, fourteen to sixteen-year-olds, and sixteen to 
eighteen-year-olds.190 Oaxacan authorities restrict incarceration options to 
adolescents fourteen or older and have an abbreviated sentencing structure 
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for fourteen to sixteen-year-old adolescents.191 This allows Oaxaca to 
emphasize community-based rehabilitation programs and minimize the 
incarcerated juvenile population. It also more closely reflects the transition 
adolescents go through in their teenage years, as they develop greater 
competency to stand trial and be held accountable for their actions. Oaxaca’s 
formal tiered system also mirrors the practical effects of Finland and 
Sweden’s juvenile justice systems, as both countries have significantly fewer 
offenders incarcerated between the ages of fifteen and seventeen than 
seventeen to twenty.192 Both models are consistent with the ECHR’s edict 
that it is “essential that a child charged with an offence [be] dealt with in a 
manner which takes full account of his age, level of maturity and intellectual 
and emotional capacities.”193 States should adopt a tiered approach to 
juvenile sentencing based on both the offender’s age and offense that reflects 
adolescents’ semi-autonomy and limited competency. 
3. Minimizing Incarceration 
In addition to raising the criminal age of responsibility and creating a 
tiered approach to sentencing, states should limit the crimes that make 
adolescent offenders eligible for incarceration. Although the primary goal of 
juvenile justice systems is rehabilitation, there is admittedly a secondary 
deterrence rationale that justifies the incarceration of juvenile offenders in 
limited circumstances. However, these circumstances are restricted to those 
violent crimes where recidivism is more likely: crimes such as murder, rape, 
and aggravated assault.194 Other crimes, like property-related crimes, fall 
under a category of “phase-specific” offenses that adolescents are likely to 
grow out of and never repeat.195 
In a related context, this dichotomy has already been recognized by the 
Supreme Court, which has held that life without parole sentences can only be 
applied to individuals where rehabilitation is not possible and recidivism is 
very likely.196 Similarly, where a teenager was expelled from Austria for 
minor offenses, the ECHR overturned the expulsion because the acts 
committed by the minor could still be “regarded as acts of juvenile 
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delinquency.”197 This approach is also used by Finland, which reserves 
incarceration remedies only for the most “extraordinary” cases.198 Finally, 
again, Oaxaca, Mexico, is a model of restraint when it comes to incarcerating 
juveniles. The Oaxacan Penal Code provides incarceration as an option only 
in cases where the adolescent has committed rape, battery causing injury, 
homicide, robbery involving physical violence, kidnapping, or human 
trafficking of children.199 By limiting the crimes adolescents could be 
incarcerated for, states could enhance the rehabilitative aspects of their 
juvenile justice systems without jeopardizing public safety or increasing 
recidivism. 
4. Diversion 
For adolescent offenders who fall into the juvenile justice system but 
who are not incarcerated, state juvenile justice systems should offer robust 
rehabilitative programs. In an advisory opinion, the IACHR has held that 
“children requir[e] . . . prompt and careful intervention on the part of well‐
equipped and well‐staffed institutions in order to resolve their problems or 
mitigate their consequences.”200 This principle has found its way into 
Scandinavian models for juvenile justice as well, where probation and fines 
are the primary forms of intervention.201 Similarly, Denmark prescribes 
activities for youth offenders as part of their child welfare system.202 
Programs modeled after these examples could also be augmented by proven 
programs like clinical family intervention and therapeutic foster care.203 By 
investing in robust programs outside of detention centers, states could 
provide rehabilitative services for adolescents who do not need to be 
incarcerated. 
5. Reimagined Juvenile Detention Centers 
Finally, states should reimagine the juvenile detention centers they do 
retain. Juvenile prisons should not be miniature adult prisons, but rather 
rehabilitative centers that emphasize education, community service, 
developing professional skills, and mental and physical health. Here, Turkey 
provides an aspirational model for the United States. In Turkey, the open-air 
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prisons resemble boarding schools and provide rehabilitative models for 
detainees within and outside the prison.204 There are robust educational 
opportunities, and adolescents often have apprenticeships in the local 
community.205 Turkey’s open-air prisons also provide psychological services 
to detainees and emphasize healthy living and physical fitness.206 Nightly 
curfews and restrictions on adolescents’ ability to go home still keep checks 
on potentially dangerous offenders while simultaneously recognizing the 
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system.207 By embracing an open-
detention center ideal for juvenile centers in the United States, states could 
reduce the negative impacts that detention centers currently have on 
adolescents. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Juvenile offenders, as a product of their age, lack the agency and 
competency to be held fully accountable for criminal actions. These 
biological facts about adolescents reinforce the traditional rehabilitative 
goals of juvenile justice and challenge the retributive models adopted by 
some countries. The ECHR has recognized the rights of juveniles to have 
their age taken into account, and though it has refrained from dictating a 
criminal age of responsibility, it has consistently emphasized the 
rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice.208 Across the pond, the IACHR has 
taken it a step further by setting a minimum criminal age of responsibility at 
twelve and emphasizing rehabilitative prison conditions for juveniles.209 
Though the home of the original juvenile justice system, the United States 
has lagged behind both the Council of Europe and the Organization of 
American States. The United States has failed to realize the lofty 
rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice and to take into account the fluid nature 
and degree of adolescents’ autonomy and culpability. To correct these 
failures, American states should (1) comply with the IACHR’s mandate and 
raise their criminal age of responsibility to at least twelve; (2) create a tiered 
sentencing model for adolescent offenders that resembles Oaxaca’s, 
Sweden’s, and Finland’s; (3) reduce the number of offenses that make 
adolescents eligible for incarceration; (4) increase rehabilitative alternatives 
to incarceration; and (5) reform juvenile detention centers to give adolescents 
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the ability to invest in their community, mental and physical fitness, 
education, and professional skills. 
